uncertain. This book deals with the experts on whom we rely for estimation and prediction. Typically, such experts are defined by their qualifications, their experience 2 -and importantly, by their status among their peers. We find someone with the right training and experience, someone whom we trust and can understand. 3 Often, expert judgement is all we have. However, our propensity to turn to experts and accept their judgements uncritically, even when we don't need to, often appears to be automatic, or at least not sufficiently cautious.
This book takes experts to include engineers, political scientists, economists, military and police officers, lawyers and financial analysts, together with the more usual chemists, physicists, geologists, biologists and medical scientists. These people may have many skills. However, their expertise for estimation and prediction is not necessarily supported by relevant, concrete actions and verifiable outcomes. When I use the term 'expert' I will refer to people who are considered by their peers and society at large to have specialist knowledge and who are consulted to make an estimate or prediction.
I will show that, in many situations, non-skill-based expertise may not be worth the time and expense involved in using it. While superficially, such expertise may appear to have the same foundations as skill, often it does not.
There is a continuum between skill-based judgement and expert predictions. An engineer's skill may be to design a particular kind of bridge. Circumstances may be such that we consult them on related matters in which they have no direct experience, such as building other kinds of bridges. Beyond that, they may also appear to be expert in more distantly related topics, such as other structures, What's wrong with consulting experts? 4 data and models on hand and to understand our context and sensitivities. We trust them to have our best interests in mind. We will see, however, that often this is not the case.
The need for experts is felt keenly when it comes to making decisions about the guilt or innocence of people in trials.
John Lawson, a lawyer from the University of Missouri, wrote the foundation rules for expert and opinion evidence for the US legal system in 1900. In these rules, opinion is not admissible So, what's the problem?
Geophysicist Ellis Krinitzsky spent many years working on earthquake risk, a notoriously difficult scientific problem. In an early review on the reliability of experts, he described an experiment in which seven geotechnical experts predicted the height of fill at which an embankment would fail, and the depth to which sediment would settle.
14 These questions were typical of the kinds of problems geotechnical experts were expected to assess reliably. The experts were provided with the data to make calculations. They used a variety of methods.
The results were not heartening. In Figure 1 www.cambridge.org © in this web service Cambridge University Press
There are at least six important things to note about the results of this simple experiment. First, the experts were generally overconfident. They were reasonably sure that the truth lay within the interval shown by the lines connecting their minimum and maximum guesses.
However, in the first case, only two people's intervals enclosed the truth. In the second case, no-one's interval enclosed the truth. If their estimates of uncertainty were generally reliable, we would expect most of the intervals to enclose the horizontal dashed lines. Because they did not, it means that, in both cases, the experts were overconfident when they assessed the reliability of their own knowledge. 15 Second, geophysicists conducted the study in the 1970s.
Therefore, technical experts have been aware of these kinds of phenomenon for at least 40 years. Third, it's possible for everyone to be wrong in the same direction. In the left-hand panel, all the experts overestimated the truth.
So, whole groups of experts may be biased.
Fourth, the fact that someone did well on one question does not mean that they will do well on another. Expert 4 did best in the right-hand panel and worst in the left-hand panel.
Fifth, the width of the intervals between the minimum and maximum values tells us how confident the experts were. In the left-hand panel, Expert 3 was confident (the interval was narrow) and accurate (the best guess was close to the truth), whereas Expert 5 was confident and inaccurate. Generally speaking, there was no clear relationship between confidence and accuracy.
Lastly, these were credible, socially accepted experts. They would have passed muster as expert scientists in a court or serving on a government panel dealing with the safety of earth embankments. All were qualified and respected members of scientific societies, attending an international scientific conference. No doubt each had a confident and plausible story to tell about how she or he arrived at an estimate and could defend the interval that she or he gave with the answers. The false-positive rate (the chance that fingerprint experts would falsely conclude two prints were the same) was satisfyingly low, at 0.1 per cent. The false-negative rate (the chance of falsely declaring two prints were different when in fact they were from the same person) was higher, at 7.5 per cent. A substantial number of the comparisons were judged by the experts to be 'inconclusive' or of no value. It is important to note that the experts knew they were being tested. We could reasonably assume that people unaware of such scrutiny may perform differently.
A UK-based study asked 27 experts to make a total of 2,484 judgements about pairs of fingerprints. 20 A quarter were controls, similar to the US-based study above. In the others, the experts were told fictitious emotional background stories that included murder and personal attacks, or they were shown disturbing photographs purportedly coming from the crime scenes from which the fingerprints were taken. Participants were not given the option of making inconclusive judgements. They had to decide either 'match' or 'no match'.
People were more likely to find a match between ambiguous fingerprints (an example is shown in Figure 1 .3) if they had been exposed to emotional background stories or photographs. Less than two years later, in 2007, the system failed ( Figure 1.4) .
Lest we forget, investment banks began to write down billions of dollars in mortgage-backed derivatives and other so-called toxic securities.
In the US, Bear Stearns collapsed, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were taken over by the federal government, Lehman Brothers fell, Merrill
Lynch was sold, AIG was saved, and a US$700 billion bailout bill was rushed into law. 24 The risks taken by the largest banks and investment firms in much of the Western world were so 'excessive and foolhardy'
that they threatened to bring down the financial system itself. 
